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A THEORY OF SOCIAL CAUSATION

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The human mind cannot rest satisfied in a chaos of unassorted facts. Some arrangement of the materials of knowledge it must make. In the degree that it gets beyond arrangements that have no real significance, to those that disclose great processes of causation, and establish their laws, it becomes scientific.

The simplest categories by which facts can be arranged are those of time and space. Chronological series and spacial descriptions are the resources of the childish mind, unable to analyze things sufficiently to discover their essential resemblances. They are the resource of great minds also, confronted by facts too strange or too complicated for other disposition. When at a loss where else to place a novel fact one puts it in a pigeon hole, under a date, or under a letter of the alphabet.

The first step toward science is taken when, among facts grouped by time or space, we observe resemblances of structure, or resemblance of activity, of function or of conduct. For result we have the classificatory stage of science, the beginning of a morphology and a physiology. When observations upon matter and its behavior were removed from the categories of days and seasons, of accidental disposition in this or that region or position, they ceased to be magic or alchemy; in an elementary way they began to be physics and chemistry. In like manner, the observed facts of plant and animal life, through studies of structure, and the resulting classifications made by Linnæus and Cuvier, became descriptive botany and comparative anatomy. They were no longer the vague natural history, half description, half anecdote, of Buffon and his predecessors.

Only after the work of classification has been accomplished ; only when the great types of structure, and the great modes of function have been revealed, is the mind able to penetrate further beneath the surface of things, and to discover there, underlying types and modes, the continuing processes, and the active causes of change and of grouping. When these discoveries have been made, the facts, correlated with general processes and with true causes, have become science, fully developed in method, and satisfying the craving of the mind for explanation in the one possible sense of that word, namely, the establishment of logical relations between instances and principles.

The more numerous, varied and complicated the facts found in any assemblage of observations or of testimonies, the more difficult it is to discover among them any other groupings than those of the time and space categories ; the longer we have to wait for that arrangement of them which can properly be called science.

Of all known assemblages of facts those pertaining to the social life and organization of man, in the past and in the present, are the most numerous, the most varied, the most intricately complicated. It is no wonder, therefore, that slow progress has been made in arranging them otherwise than by the simple categories of time and space. These have determined a subdivision of the whole field into three great branches of concrete social knowledge. Social statistics, as Seignobos, in his study of historical method, has said, is primarily separated from history not by that difference of method which also exists, but by the mere circumstance that social statistics concerns itself with social facts under observation in the present, while history concerns itself with social facts observed and recorded in the past. In like manner, while one way of stating the delimitation of history from ethnography would be to say that history studies societies that have arrived at civilization, while ethnography studies societies still uncivilized, the more familiar statement is, that ethnography studies man as geographically distributed, while history studies him in so far as he has had a chronologically ordered and recorded career. Furthermore, in the internal arrangement of the facts making up each of these branches of social knowledge, the space and time categories still hold sway. Ethnography is only now emerging from an arrangement of its materials according to a merely geographical scheme. The great bulk of all written history is still frankly chronological in its arrangement; and social statistics has not to any great extent gotten beyond the simplest spacial categories.

Yet, within recent years, there has been a growing restiveness under these limitations, and not a decade goes by without attempts to grapple anew with the problem of a more scientific comprehension. Some progress has been made towards substituting the categories of structure and of function for those of time and space, as was done in natural history when the classification by morphological types arose. For example, in ethnography we have attempts to group the known facts of primitive society according to various psychological principles and schemes of culture. We have the subdivision of historical materials into cultural and institutional history, and, more minutely, into religious, economic, juristic and political history. In social statistics we are beginning to recognize distinctions that mark off the statistics of population proper from statistics of the social mind; these from statistics of social organization; and these, in turn, from statistics of the social welfare.

Even this measure of progress has not satisfied. From time to time the attempt is made to get below classification itself, and to discover in social evolution an orderly process, appealing to the rational intelligence, and to find its underlying laws and causes. This is the explanation of the ever-recurring interest in some scheme of the philosophy of history, or in some principle of interpretation. The great concept of universal evolution, which has brought order and harmony into the sciences of life and of mind, has powerfully stimulated a desire to develop the concrete social sciences of ethnography, history and statistics, into true explanatory sciences, and to fashion their materials, by correlation with principles of causation into a reasoned science of sociology.

Not less significant, furthermore, is the circumstance that of these various attempts those that have contained any element of mysticism or of transcendentalism have fallen into discredit. He would be a bold man who today, after a thorough training in the best historical scholarship, should venture to put forth a philosophy of history in terms of the divine ideas, or to trace the plan of an Almighty in the sequence of human events. On the other hand, those interpretations that are characterized as materialistic, and that try to find the causes of social evolution in the action of the physical environment, or that, seeking explanation in the tremendous process of the struggle for existence, find an interpretation in the circumstances of man's economic life, are daily winning serious respect. In so far as they fail to satisfy, it is because they have not yet shown how, out of such materialistic causes, there emerge the complex phenomena that take shape in cultural activities; in the infinitely involved psychological aspects of man's collective life; and, above all, in those sublime idealisms that bear multitudes of human beings into struggles that seem to sacrifice all considerations of utility, of prudence even, in the pursuit of some glorious aim that appeals only to the soul.

Is the problem insoluble that is thus presented by the existence of social idealism in a material world? I do not think so. Believing that in certain elementary social facts long recognized as interesting, but not always seized upon as significant, we have the data for correlating the idealistic aspects of social evolution with its material basis, I venture to bring forward tentatively a theory of social causation. I hope that it may contribute something toward a rational ordering of the great mass of materials presented to us by ethnography, by history, and by statistics, in a science of society; and that, as the principles of such a science gain acceptance, it may pay its debt to these branches of knowledge by making over to them categories of arrangement and helpful working hypotheses.

At the outset we may take a hint from the psychologists. Scientific psychology has found one way, and only one, to avoid any assumption of either materialism or idealism, in the philosophical sense of those words. It consists in centering attention upon the correlations of material and mental phenomena, rather than on the nature of things in themselves. External things are conceived as stimuli, and internal processes are conceived as responses to stimuli. Causation within the realm of mental phenomena, is thus regarded as psycho-physical. It is a process in which the mental order changes in definite ways corresponding to changes in an external order. To discover these ways and to formulate their laws is a sufficient scientific achievement in psychology. It is unnecessary to raise any question of the identity, or of the duality, of mind and matter.

This conception we must carry over into sociology. Causation in society is not at one extreme a merely physical process; nor is it, at the other extreme, an outworking of some mysterious entity called free-will, that is in no wise conditioned by the external world. Like the activity of the individual mind, it is a psycho-physical process, in which physical stimuli, on the one hand, and motor-reactions, accompanied by feeling and by thought, on the other hand, are inseparably associated.

Accepting this hint, we make the initial assumption that the institutions of human society, and all the events of history, including the migrations of men from place to place, the great enthusiasms, the intellectual awakenings, the wars and the revolutions, may be regarded as responses to varying stimuli, and that they are governed by certain laws of combination, or by certain facts of resemblance or of difference among the minds responding.

The illuminating aid of concrete example will help to make this somewhat unfamiliar way of looking at the subject more definite and real. In the codes of ancient law that have come down to us from peoples emerging from a tribal into a civic life, there are pictures of spontaneous social action that, by reason of their relative simplicity, enable us to see the essential nature of social processes more distinctly than we do when we observe the exceeding complexity of modern institutional activity. Of such pictures I know of none more clearly reflecting the social process as a psychological phenomenon than do those curious and beautiful triads of Dyvnwal Moelmud that are included in the Ancient Laws of Wales. In simple language, almost poetical in form, the various occasions that draw men together in mote, or meeting, are described. Here are examples:

> 5. There are three motes of mutual protection: an outpouring mote; mast gathering; and co-tillage. Herein the hand of everyone is required to assist according to his ability.
>
> 6. There are three horn motes: the assembling of the country by elders and chiefs of kindreds; the horn of harvest; and the horn of battle and war, against the molestation of a border country and strangers.
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> 14. There are three motes of consociation: a convention of a country and elders, arranging the laws and judgments of a common country; bards as teachers of sciences, where they assemble in session; and the congress of a kindred, at a meeting for worship on the principal high festivals.
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> 15. There are three motes of imminent attack: the inroad of a border country enemy; the cry, or the horn, of murder and waylaying; and a hamlet on fire: for assistance is required from everybody.
>
> 16. There are three horns of joint mote: the horn of harvest; the horn of pleadings; and the horn of worship.
>
> 17. There are three motes of commotion: the horn of the country; ships from a strange country effecting a landing; and the non-return of the messenger of a country and elders from a foreign country.
>
> 18. There are three motes of request: for tillage; festal games; and burning of woods; for, upon a request, they are not to be impeded.
>
> 21. There are three motes of pursuit: after a wolf; after thieves; and after a mad dog; and all who shall hear the cry are to assemble together.
>
> 22. There are three outpouring motes: the approach of strangers without permission; the depredation of a border country; and a pack of wolves.
>
> 26. There are three motes of banishment: for murder and waylaying; treason against the state, or treachery to the country and kindred; and irretrievable spoliation; for it is required of everybody, of every sex and age within hearing of the horn, in the direction taken, to accompany the progress of that exile; and keep up the barking of dogs, to the period of putting to sea, and until the one banished shall have gone three score hours out of sight.

The social process revealed by these pictures of a simple community life does not admit of misinterpretation. Not only is each example of collective action a response to stimulus, but it is even so conceived by the writer of the triads, who, in turn, represents the people as themselves thinking of the social process in such terms. The horn, the cry, the alarm, are deliberately used as stimuli, supplementing the stimuli that would be afforded by mere perception or rumor of certain events or opportunities. The hastening together of the people in public mote or meeting, in its turn, is not only a spontaneous response, but even one that has in it the elements of conscious knowledge that such response is expected, whenever the horn or other alarm is heard.

From these concrete examples we must pass to a broader and somewhat more abstract view. Organization and institutional life must be regarded not as things, but as modes of habitual activity among men. A government, a corporation, a household, is a group of persons regularly doing certain things in certain ways. All therefore may be regarded as phenomena of collective conduct. Conduct, in its turn, as Mr. Spencer has shown in the "Data of ethics," is merely one part of mental activity. It is a consciously controlled aggregate of acts adjusted to ends. The other part of mental activity is made up of more or less unconscious deeds or experiences, including impulsive outbursts and instinctive acts.

One further step brings us back to our fundamental generalization. In the last analysis the entire mental process is an infinitely complex series of responses to stimuli. Not all responses, however, are collective.

Not all are like responses by many individuals to the same given stimulus. But if, as individuals, men were always moved to act in wholly unlike ways; if they were moved to feel differently and to think differently on every subject, their conduct would be without order. There would be a state of affairs far more chaotic than any state of nature imagined by Hobbes or Rousseau. There would be no common interests, no sympathies, no public opinion, no coöperation. All of these things are agreeing responses to common stimuli, and all are of the essential phenomena of society. Society, then, conceived in terms of its fundamental process, may be regarded as a complex aggregate of agreeing responses to certain stimuli that act upon many men in like ways.

All things, however, are relative, and that which from one point of view is general, from another point of view may be special. While like response to stimulus is the general form of social action, it is at the same time a special form of wider processes, constituting universal evolution. In human society, as in the realms of animal life and of vegetation, we see processes of selection and of survival; processes of adaptation ; and processes of conflict, resulting in subjugations, exploitations, or transformations of the weak by the strong. And we know that all of these phenomena are modes of that ceaseless equilibration that goes on between bodies highly charged with energy, and bodies undercharged. It is natural, therefore, that we have theories of society in which all changes are baldly stated in terms of conflict, as in the sociological systems of Gumplowicz and Novicow, or as in the Marxian theories of exploitation. These theories are unsatisfactory because they ignore a certain determining, directing, controlling step in the series of transformations. Steam escaping by the safety valve, and steam exhausted back of the piston head—both are transformations of energy, but they produce different effects, because they enter into different correlations. In society all the forces of nature and of mind work through the correlations of stimulus and of like or unlike response. Every conflict and every selection is cast into a certain form, and the form determines results. Every conflict is a group of responses to stimulus, but it may consist of responses to differing stimuli, or of differing responses to the same stimulus, and the sociological consequences of this difference may be momentous. Again, in society every selection, as truly as every conflict, is a group of responses to stimuli, but it may consist in unlike responses to the same stimulus, or, in responses that as far as they go are alike but are unequal. In the one case we have all the possibilities of toleration and of liberty, notwithstanding disagreement. In the other case we have all the possibilities of subordination and of exploitation.

The great forces, then, of nature and of mind do not pass over into society except as they are correlated or organized in the phenomena of more or less like response. We have still to enquire, however, whether the energizing forces pass into the phenomena of stimulation and response directly, or only through certain antecedent groupings in the phenomena of the physical world. In other words, can we carry our theory of social causation back to firm foundations of physical data, in those groupings of objective fact which, collectively, we call the material environment?

Happily it is possible to answer this question, because it is obvious to even a superficial observer that the stimuli themselves to which men collectively respond are of two great orders.

The most immediate and the most important stimuli of modern social life are products of past responses to yet earlier stimuli. The very arrangements under which we live, the groupings of human beings, their ideas and purposes, their aims, their ideals, their laws and institutions are ever-present, ever-potent causes of continuing collective action. Of all the stimuli that move men to mighty and glorious coöperation, none can be compared with a great ideal. The ideals of liberty, of freedom, of enlightenment, lift men to-day in gigantic waves of collective effort like resistless tides of the sea. American life pre-eminently has consisted in responses to these ideals. The Declaration of Independence was an ideal, and nothing more; but the response to it was the successful struggle of a people to establish itself forever among the nations of the earth as a republic of men pledged unalterably to civil liberty. The federal constitution, drafted by Hamilton and his co-workers, was a stupendous ideal. The response to it was its acceptance by thirteen commonwealths, and subsequently the rising of a mighty people to maintain and to consolidate for all time, the indissoluble Union.

But back of all these secondary stimuli, products of past social life, are original stimuli presented to every mind by the presence of fellow beings, by the concrete objects of nature, by the events and the order of nature. These collectively are the environment. As environments differ in fundamental character and in complexity, so differ the original stimuli to which the minds of men respond in collective action, and the possibilities of institutional life.

Accepting the unmistakable distinction between primary and secondary stimuli of social activity, the prime requirement laid upon social theory is revealed. A scientific theory of social causation must show how the primary stimuli give rise to the secondary. Above all, it must disclose the process through which the great ideals arise. It must reveal the successive stages through which the stimuli collectively making up the physical environment create ultimately the stimuli and the responses of idealistic conduct.

Here, then, is our whole hypothesis in restatement. Sociological study is the scientific examination of all those phenomena that proceed from like responses by many individuals to the same stimuli. A theory of social causation may be constructed if we can discover the conditions under which like response is inevitable or possible; the laws of arrangement of combination according to which various kinds of stimuli become operative; and the combinations of human activity that must follow as the extent and degree of like response are more or less. In the theory here presented the ultimate causes of society are assumed to be objectively the great physical processes of equilibration, conflict and selection, and subjectively the elemental appetites and passions of the animate organism. But it is further assumed that physical and mental forces create society only as they are correlated and combined in certain concrete forms. Combined in various types of environment the physical forces are complexes of primary stimuli. As such they determine; first, the character, the extent, and the groupings of primary response; and secondly, the genesis of secondary stimuli. The various correlations of response are the phenomena of conflict, adaptation and selection in their social aspect. The combinations of response are the modes of coöperation, the great processes of history, and the forms of social organization.

Essaying now to expand this theory into a more intelligible detail, we necessarily begin with an attempt to discover what features of the physical habitat of a human population are significant, and through what channels or groupings of concrete fact they exert their controlling influence upon collective aims and activities.

The earlier theories of the relation of environment to national life and character placed emphasis upon the direct influence of soil, climate and topography upon mental and institutional life.

Montesquieu hardly got beyond this simple view of the problem. He attributes a relatively great boldness to the inhabitants of cold climates, and to boldness he attributes frankness and a lack of suspicion and cunning. To the enervating influence of great heat, and the deliciousness of rest in a hot climate, he attributes the belief of the Hindoo that "repose and non-existence are the foundation of all things, and the end in which they terminate." From these temperamental effects of climate Montesquieu thought that he could derive systems of laws and institutions. His observations, nevertheless, were keen and significant, and doubtless much important scientific work is yet to be done in following out the suggestions in which "The spirit of the laws" abounds.

Buckle, perceiving that the action of environment upon national life is more complex than Montesquieu represented it, laid emphasis upon those influences of nature that develop on the one hand the emotional, on the other hand the intellectual habit. Regions in which nature is uncertain, violent and destructive, especially where earthquakes, volcanic catastrophies and tempests abound, inspire terror and superstition, and thereby unfit the mind for scientific research and for the systematic conquest of the external world. Regions that are tractable, having seldom more startling occurrences than the regular succession of seasons and the relatively mild storms of the temperate zones, awaken an intellectual interest; and by suggesting a constant order in nature, they lead the mind on to scientific comprehension. Buckle also made the distinction between primary and secondary civilizations, and drew attention to the exceeding importance of the relation existing between any secondary civilization and that environment to which we must apply the adjective "social" rather than "physical."

Spencer, in the first volume of his "Principles of sociology", comprehensively reviews the influence of climates and topographies upon the emotional and the intellectual natures of men, and he calls especial attention to the relation of the flora and the fauna to the possibilities of social evolution. He lays chief stress, however, upon the sociological environment, since it is in the relation of a tribe or a nation to its stronger or weaker neighbors that the causes determining its type of organization as military or industrial, seem to him to be found.

In those later studies that have taken the form of an economic interpretation of history, it is an indirect rather than a direct action of the environment that finds recognition. Situation and resources mould the social organization; first, by determining the character of the predominant industries; and, secondly, by determining the prevailing form of property, as real estate or free capital.

The theory that I wish to submit differs from all of these. I shall try to show that the really significant phenomenon is found in the relation of the physical environment to the composition of its population. My propositions are, first, that the character of the environment determines the composition of a population as more or less heterogeneous, more or less compound; and second, that the composition of the population determines its mental characteristics, its potentialities of coöperation, its capacity for progress, its ideals, and its organization as more or less democratic.

To develop these propositions, let us begin with a phenomenon very simple, very obvious, yet very far-reaching in its consequences. A physical environment has, or it has not, the power to attract inhabitants to itself and to keep them. In America we are witnessing the most remarkable example in human history of this immediate relation of population to environment. By hundreds of thousands men and women from the older lands are drawn here by the bounty of nature, underlying that varied economic opportunity which this nation affords to its people. Quite as striking as the mere numbers of immigrants to America, however, is the varied composition of our foreign born population. Every nationality is included. But the geographical distribution of the foreign born shows a marked difference of one region from another in degree of compositeness. The North Atlantic division is heterogeneous in the extreme. Thirty-six per cent of its foreign born are of English-teutonic blood; twenty-nine per cent are Celtic; eight per cent are Celto-latin, nine per cent are Ibero-latin, and seventeen per cent are Slavonic. The North Central division has an overwhelming preponderance of Teutonic stocks. Seventy-one per cent of its foreign born are of English-teutonic bloods. Only twelve per cent are Celtic; only three per cent are Celto-latin, less than two per cent are Ibero-latin, and ten per cent are Slavonic.

Environments are of two fundamental types in respect of their power to maintain society; those that are so poorly endowed with resources that they can maintain and attract only relatively small numbers of inhabitants, and those that, being richly endowed, support large populations of the native born, and tend to draw a large immigration from elsewhere. Each of these types of environment, in turn, presents two well-marked subdivisions: the isolated, or difficult of access or of egress; and the accessible, a land of ports and open ways, through which the currents of population may easily flow.

The composition of the population can by no possibility be the same in these four types of environment. That which is characteristic of one is unattainable in another. And because the composition of the population is in each case of a certain necessary description, there is a corresponding make-up of the social mind, a certain range of possibility in the succession of historical events, and a certain necessary order of social institutions.

In the environment that is both poor and isolated population is not only sparse, but it is relatively simple and homogeneous in composition. It is maintained only by its birth rate, and it increases only if its birth rate is in excess of its death rate. It is a genetic aggregation. Extreme examples of this environment and of the structure of its population are afforded by the coasts of Greenland, the Aleutian Islands, the southern extremity of South America, and the interior regions of Australia.

In the environment that is poor but accessible, or, what in this instance is more to the point, admits of easy egress, the population again is a genetic aggregation. The attractions and inducements are not sufficient to bring immigration. But neither are they sufficient in all cases to keep the men born within its borders, and, escape being relatively easy, many of the most energetic emigrate to better lands. Here, in the concrete, the process of selection is seen going on in the form of response to stimulus. The resources of other environments in some degree awaken the desire of all the inhabitants of the impoverished land, but only those that are relatively enterprising and energetic are moved to better their condition. The result is a gradual deterioration of the stock remaining in the land. It is bred from the leavings that have been incapable of efficiently responding to the stimulus of larger opportunities. The most interesting modern examples of such environments are those extensive tracts of upland or hill country in the North Atlantic states, especially in the New England states, that once had prosperous farming populations, but now are inhabited only by unambitious families presenting the unmistakable marks of degeneration.

The third type of environment is that which is both rich in resources and relatively isolated or inaccessible. The interior of the Arabian peninsula, the Hawaiian Islands, the Samoan Islands, and the islands of Tahiti, are good examples. So also are the uplands of Mexico and Peru. Here again the population is a great kinship, a genetic aggregation. It is relatively dense. The birth rate is high, and every inequality of energy or ability counts in the struggle for existence. The people alike respond to the bounty of nature and develop those simple forms of economic activity that often are sufficient to create a fair degree of prosperity. The isolation of such a population while it lasts determines the whole course of social evolution, but it is relative. Sooner or later, or perhaps repeatedly at long intervals, it yields to migration. An increasing pressure of the native born upon the means of subsistence at length forces some of the more vigorous elements to break through confining barriers, and as conquerors, or otherwise, to seek distant homes; or the natural resources and the acquired prosperity enjoyed by the inhabitants become a stimulus of sufficient power to tempt distant populations to invade and exploit.

There remain environments of the fourth type, richly bountiful in resources and so accessible that men may flock to them from all quarters of the world. Such are the great river valleys of the Nile and the Euphrates, seats of the most ancient civilizations; of the Po, the Danube and the Rhine, highways of the nations from an immemorial past; of the Seine and the Thames; and, in our own land, the Mississippi basin. Such also are many favored coasts, abounding in inlets and sheltering ports. In all such environments population must sooner or later be composite, and the more so if their resources are not only abundant, but also varied.

The composition, however, is determined in the long run by two co-operating processes. Aboriginal populations are overrun by invaders, who come not as individuals, but as organized bands, or armies equipped for conquest. Populations that have attained a measure of economic advancement are now and again overrun by hosts of ruder people that have been dwelling in relatively unkindly habitats. Further conquests also may follow, after civilization has been attained by both the invaders and the invaded, if the civilization of the invaders is still of the military type. When, however, industrial civilizations of the modern type have been reached, further migration is a movement of individuals.

It happens, therefore, that with few if any exceptions the populations of the most favored environments are both compound and composite; compound as being made up of successive strata of conquered and conquerors, and composite, as being made up of immigrant individuals scattered among the native-born. In time all of these elements are in some degree amalgamated. The amalgamation of invaded and invaders, however, is determined largely by the physical characteristics of the region itself. If they are such as to tempt the invaders to scatter themselves throughout the land as local overlords, while at the same time maintaining a general distribution of the invaded or conquered, the possibilities of amalgamation are far greater than when for any reason either stratum is geographically concentrated. This seems to have been the history of the thoroughgoing amalgamation of Celtic and Teutonic elements in the midland and western counties of England.

When an immigration of individuals begins to bring important additions to a compound population, the foreign-born element itself may be more or less composite. And this circumstance again is determined by the character of the physical environment. If the natural resources, while great, are all of one kind, and especially if they are predominantly agricultural, the inhabitants are far more homogeneous than if the resources are in mineral wealth, or, above all, if they are varied, including commercial and manufacturing opportunities. Thus, we have seen that the foreign-born population of the northern Mississippi Valley is predominantly Teutonic, while that of the North Atlantic states is composite in the highest degree. Practically, however, an environment of homogeneous resources is usually but part of a larger geographic unity that is occupied by one entire people, and that in the aggregate includes resources of varied kinds. This integral geographic unity inevitably has a population that not only is largely congregate, rather than genetic, in origin, but that also is in a high degree composite.

Now we have to turn from predominantly physical phenomena to consider the mental resemblances and differences, the sympathies and antipathies, the agreements of thought and purpose, the concerted volition, the forms of co-operation, and the social bonds that arise in various populations.

Peoples dwelling in environments of the first two types that have been described are mentally, as well as in blood, homogeneous. They have been subjected to like experiences, and have developed like qualities of nature, and like habits of thought. Undisturbed by the external world, they lead uneventful lives. There is among them a strong sense of kinship. If natural resources are sufficient to sustain a fair degree of comfort, and degeneration through emigration of the more energetic individuals has not yet begun, the people are a sympathetic, kindly folk. They may not be keenly aware of their mental homogeneity because nothing happens to call attention to such possibilities of difference as exist in populations of the composite type. Co-operation is spontaneous, and the chief social bonds are kindliness and neighborly helpfulness. The social organization is simple.

The inhabitants of an environment of the third type are homogeneous in blood, but because population there is relatively dense, individual differences in energy and ability are of some importance, and there are resulting inequalities in the responsiveness of the entire people to given stimuli. Certain persons lead, others follow. There is a tendency to differentiate into dominant and subordinate classes. There are marked differences of intellectual power, yet as a whole the people has a consciousness of kind. It is sympathetic, and engages in spontaneous forms of coöperation. Its social bonds, however, include allegiance to leadership, and the contagious forms of popular emotion.

In environments of the fourth type every variety of mental difference is found, and yet it is entirely possible, in fact usual, that mental heterogeneity is less than ethnic. Men of different bloods may have minds and interests alike. Herein lies the possiblility of assimilation, which tends continually to overcome original differences in a population of miscellaneous ethnic elements. Commonly also, assimilation—which is purely a psychological process—goes on more rapidly than amalgamation,—the physical commingling of bloods. Furthermore, it is entirely possible that mental differences in a mixed population shall be subordinate to great unifying feelings, great purposes, or great ideals, and therefore possible for men otherwise differing to unite their efforts in large coöperative endeavors.

Among these mental and practical possibilities the various aspects of co-operation are of chief interest to the sociologist and the historian, and three of them are of pre-eminent importance. One is the extent to which co-operation is possible among any given people. Another is the degree to which co-operation is free and democratic, as contrasted with a co-operation that is coercively enforced by an autocratic power, monarchial or oligarchical. The third aspect is the extent to which co-operation is, on the one hand, mob-like, unreasoning in its form and spirit, or, on the other hand, deliberative and rational.

The key to all problems presented by these varied aspects of co-operation is found in that composition of the population that we have been examining. The people that is mentally homogeneous can co-operate in ways, and, above all, in a spirit, impossible to a people that is heterogeneous.

Certain corollaries derived from the fundamental principle of like response must guide our study. These corollaries are in their nature abstract propositions. They may as well be stated concisely in all their unattractive bareness, because, like mathematical axioms, they gain nothing from attempted translation into concrete terms.

In a homogeneous group a majority of all individuals may alike respond to varied stimuli, and the stimuli are not necessarily powerful. The co-operation of such individuals is spontaneous. Their organization may be democratic in form and spirit.

In a homogeneous group the like responses of many individuals to the same stimulus are not greatly unequal in degree. Consequently, there is no sharp division of the group into two classes, composed respectively of those persons that have initiative, and those that merely assent: the classes, namely, of the leaders and the followers. Any individual may at one time suggest and lead, at another time yield assent.

In the homogeneous group there is a substantial equality of energy and ability, and, consequently, but little transformation of the weak by the strong. There is no exploitation.

Therefore, in the homogeneous group there is a strong and inclusive consciousness of kind.

In the heterogeneous group a majority of all individuals can respond in like ways to comparatively few stimuli, and these must be powerful.

In the heterogeneous group more individuals are alike in instincts and in motor impulses than in sympathies, and more are alike in sympathies than in intelligence. In this group, therefore, more individuals can alike respond to stimuli that appeal to motor impulse, or to feeling, than to stimuli that appeal to intelligence. The stimuli that most powerfully appeal to motor impulse are danger and menace. Among those that appeal to instinct and feeling both, are bribe, gift, patronage and payment; while the stimulus that most strongly appeals to feeling only, or to states of mind in which feeling is predominant, is the impressive power of a strong personality.

In the heterogeneous group there is inequality of energy and of ability. Responses to any given stimulus, therefore, even when otherwise alike, are unequal in degree. Certain individuals take the initiative, and others accept their guidance. The population is differentiated into leaders and followers.

In the population so differentiated there is an equilibration of human energies that becomes a transformation of the weak by the strong. It may take the form of subjugation, or of exploitation. This happens not only in the relations of differing races to one another, but also throughout the social system,—in ecclesiastical organization to the advantage of the priesthood, in industrial organization to the advantage of the entrepreneur or the walking delegate, in political organization to the advantage of the boss and his henchmen.

In the mentally heterogeneous population there is either no general consciousness of kind, or it is weak. If the population is compound there may be a strong consciousness of race or class differences.

From the foregoing principles it follows that a population that is heterogeneous in blood, ideas and interests to an extreme degree cannot spontaneously combine its efforts in co-operative undertakings. It acts collectively only in response to some extraordinary stimulus, or to one that appeals only to the relatively low instincts. Fear of the torture, imprisonment, or death that a conqueror may inflict, may be the only stimulus to which all of the extremely diverse elements of a compound population can respond, and the resulting social organization is then despotic. When, however, a large measure of assimilation has been achieved, it is possible for elements still diverse, though not in an extreme degree, to respond to other stimuli than danger, and to establish systems of organization that, while still monarchial or oligarchical in form, are not despotic in character. The governing power may offer benefits that strongly appeal to the masses governed, or it may have acquired a religious sanctity that impresses,—that derives strength from associated stimuli of belief and dogma. The chief stimulus, however, that under the circumstances assumed is efficient in achieving organized co-operation, is the impressive power of a strong personality. The government evolved may be dignified as "Cæsarism," or irreverently described as "boss rule," but it is all one in essence. Generalizing, we may say that the heterogeneous community is normally autocratic, or oligarchical in organization. If the leaders can inspire fear, their rule is despotic. If they can inspire veneration, their rule is authoritative. If they can inspire admiration and confidence and confer favors, their power is the rule of "the boss." Historically, the co-operation that has in it a large element of coercion, is likely to be the first one to arise in such a mixed population as results from migration, or the colonizing of a new land. This stage is likely to be followed by one of oligarchic or of personal rule. Very slowly and very late in the history of any people or organization does it become thoroughly democratic in spirit and in form.

Nevertheless, from the moment when the assimilation of miscellaneous elements begins, there is likely to be an evolution of an entirely new order of stimuli, far higher in character than the primitive stimuli of danger, menace and bribe; higher even than the stimulus of strong personality; and yet, like these, powerful enough to awaken the responses of differing natures. These new and higher stimuli are ideals, and it is these that presently become a factor of chief importance in the higher forms of social causation. It is through responsiveness to ideals that it becomes possible for a people to combine three somewhat antagonistic conditions in their social evolution, namely: first, cohesion, which, in the last analysis, is a continuing agreement of response to common stimuli; secondly, variation and progress, which are possible only when the individual units making up a population are not too much alike; and thirdly, increasing freedom of individual life, which is possible only when cohesion can be maintained in the absence of coercive stimuli, and notwithstanding the divergencies inherent in individual differentiation.

Social ideals arise in the minds of exceptional individuals who perceive that their conceptions of their fellow men, like their ideas of the external world in general, fall into intellectual arrangements or combinations that differ from objective arrangements in the world of reality. Among such combinations are some that seem to the minds that make them preferable to the combinations existing in fact. These mental complexes become ideals of a social order that appeals to imagination and desire. Communicated by their creators to their fellow men they oftentimes have the power to call forth persistent effort to transform the external order of things into a realization of the ideal. All history is full of examples of men mentally unlike in most respects, but alike in their interest in a common social ideal. This is because the ideal is a highly composite stimulus appealing to motor impulse, to feeling and to imagination, as well as to reason. It happens, therefore, that men who could be organized only through the agency of a great personality, if the alternative stimuli were no more than ideas or plans that appealed to the intellect alone, can sometimes be organized by a great ideal, even more successfully than by authority, or by the boss.

With these principles and possibilities before us, we now ask how they are combined in the historical process, inquiring, as we proceed, how ideals emerge, and how they transform the coercive and authoritative modes of co-operation into the liberal and the democratic.

For the purposes of this paper I shall restrict myself to a consideration of three great social ideals; those, of unity, of liberty, and of equality.

Again we turn our attention to the composition of the population, for herein are to be discovered the conditions that determine the evolution of ideals and the great stages of historical process.

A social group of any kind or dimension, let it be, if you please, a trade union, a township, or a nation, may be conceived as having so many elements of unity that it is easy for individuals that agree in their thoughts and purposes to have their own way with such of their fellows as differ from the prevailing type. Such a mass of agreements entering into a collective will, is the fact of collective sovereignty in its most general psychological aspect. In any community where the power and the wish of some section of the population to rule has been developed, differences and disagreements excite antagonism, distrust and anxiety. It is perceived that there is strength in unity, and the passion to make all men within the community more alike begins to be consciously felt, and to make itself a power. The ideal of unity is carefully formulated, and is persistently kept before the minds of all members of the group. If the group is a voluntary organization, like a religious denomination, a trade union, or a political party, an attempt is made to persuade or to compel all its members to believe the same things, and to conduct themselves in like ways. A creed, a body of rules or a platform is imposed, and orthodoxy or regularity is insisted upon as of primary obligation. If the society is a nation, attention is fixed upon other modes of unity also. The territory itself that the people occupies becomes an object of new interest. Adjoining geographical areas, that by reason of topographical features naturally belong with the domain already possessed are covetously regarded, and the attempt is made to conquer or otherwise to annex them. Adjacent populations having like interests and traditions, related in blood, and speaking allied languages, are viewed as properly belonging to the community that would absorb and dominate them. Within the population itself the amalgamation of bloods is watched with interest, and the process of mental assimilation with yet more concern. Policies are adopted to hasten on the change. One language must be spoken throughout the whole domain. One religious faith must be embraced by all. One consistent economic policy must be followed. One standard of conduct and of legality must be established for all citizens. These policies are a part of the great nation-making plan of unification. If successful, the passion for homogeneity seizes upon the whole population. An ideal that has at first taken possession of the ruling classes, has gradually awakened the enthusiasm of a people. The ideal itself has been suggested by changes quite unconsciously originating. Amalgamation and assimilation necessarily forecast the kind of community that must exist if they go on to completion. Co-operating with this suggestion is a consciousness of the exceeding difficulty of maintaining social cohesion where great differences of blood and interest exist.

Thus it is the composition of a population under circumstances of diminishing heterogeneity that gives rise to the first great ideal—that of unity.

Perfect unification, complete homogeneity, would inhibit further progress ; but the perfect unification of an arrested civilization is rarely attained. So long as there remain in the population many diverse elements freely communicating with one another, and still undergoing assimilation, the conditions are present for progress. No scheme of unification ever quite destroys the restless individualism of the rational mind. Unifying policies, involving as they do a large measure of coercion, much repression of individual initiative, and much thwarting of ambition, goad the more rebellious spirits into open opposition, which can be repressed only if all heretics and disturbers of the political peace can be exterminated. At the same time, by putting an end to many conflicts between independent states that have at length been brought into an inclusive national or imperial organization, the unifying policy releases energy to expend itself in commercial enterprise, in public agitation, in destructive criticism and perhaps in overt rebellion. Under these circumstances the stimulus of authority begins to lose its power, and the ideal of unity ceases to impress the imagination with the old time vividness. New ideas take shape in an ideal of liberty, which appeals with increasing force to men of every blood, of every degree of culture and of economic condition. The broadening response to this new stimulus in time creates the great policies of liberty, including the establishment and protection of individual liberty by forms of constitutional law.

But just as the policy of unification when pressed too far creates reactions against itself, so also does a régime of unlimited liberty. It creates conditions of great and increasing inequality. The energetic and the enterprising, unrestrained in their activity, acquire control of the machinery of government, of the administration of law, and of economic opportunities. Enjoying perfect freedom of contract, they organize the industrial system to secure the utmost increase of wealth and its utmost monopolization. Having through liberty obtained power, they proceed by all possible means to monopolize liberty itself, taking care to maintain those legal forms of freedom that protect property and enterprise, and that encourage competition among wage-earning laborers, while more than willing to restrict competition among themselves. An increasing density of population intensifies the struggle for existence. Class differentiation is hastened, and presently social cohesion is threatened through the exploitation of the weak by the strong. From the exploited comes the demand for wider opportunity and a larger share in material prosperity. It is perceived by the intelligent that if a disruption of the community through a revolt of the discontented, or a general revolution, is to be prevented, some limitation of the liberty of the strong to curtail the liberties of the weak must be imposed, and that practically this means a certain limitation of liberty by equality. It is under these circumstances that the ideal of equality arises, and that its influence over the multitude creates the democratic movement, as that term is understood in modern times.

Certain conditions, however, must be fulfilled before this ideal can be converted into reality. We have seen that democracy is possible and normal in a homogeneous population. It is possible also in a population that is otherwise heterogeneous, if there is a practically universal belief in the superiority of democratic forms; if the democratic ideal is a strongly dominant stimulus, calling forth the habitual response of nearly all men. Under these conditions there can be democracy, at least to the extent of majority rule.

Democracy, however, is not necessarily more liberal than monarchy or oligarchy. In recent years we are witnessing abundant proofs that in its denial of the liberty of the individual a majority may be as despotic as an Italian tyrant, or a Turkish sultan. Democracy can be of the liberal sort under any one of three possible conditions. The first exists when the people are homogeneous and equal. Co-operation then is spontaneous, and democracy is the normal form of organization. The second exists when an entire people, though otherwise heterogeneous, cherishes the ideal of liberty, and is sensitively responsive to it. The third exists when extreme inequalities of condition are being modified by an equilibration of energies in which the strong, instead of exploiting the weak, are succeeding through policies of helpfulness and justice, and by education, in developing and lifting them up to a higher plane of social efficiency.

Passing over the two conditions first named, we may profitably linger for a moment upon the process of equilibration through education and justice. It begins when society has become complex enough to pass from policies of unification to those of liberalism and democracy. It is a common error of popular sociological thinking to conceive of philanthropic activities as a conscious combating of that order of nature which has its sources in physical phenomena, and which assumes in the organic world the form of the struggle for existence. In reality the philanthropic process is inevitable, and happily, here and there a student of social evolution is beginning to apprehend its nature and causation.

Mr. Benjamin Kidd, for example, has attempted to prove that all real progress has its cause in a fact that he calls projected efficiency. Those organisms and those institutions survive, he tells us, that have potential qualities that will be realized in future race development. Mr. Kidd has in this hypothesis taken hold of a great truth, but I think that he has not stated it in the clearest and most accurate way. We cannot say that an organism survives because of qualities or peculiarities of structure that would give it an advantage in another environment, or at some future time. It does not maintain itself in the struggle of the here and now because it has potentialities that will enable its offspring to survive in the terrestrial elsewhere and hereafter. Nevertheless, it is an elementary truth that certain organisms develop surplus energy, and that surplus energy sometimes enables them to survive under circumstances that would bring death to creatures less generously endowed. Now it is these organisms endowed with surplus energy that transmit to posterity a rich legacy of ability, or, in certain instances, convey to fellow-creatures of their own generation a freely given help. Of all the higher organisms, and especially of all successful individuals in human society, it must be said that any advantage that they enjoy they owe to an efficiency that was transmitted to them by their ancestry, or freely made over to them by contemporaries endowed with surplus energy that has been expended in socially helpful ways. Of all the modes of socially distributed surplus energy, the most important are sympathy and its allied elements in the consciousness of kind. Given this force, the transformation of the weak by the strong necessarily becomes to some extent an uplifting, instead of an exploitation. Given the equilibration of energy through uplifting, there is a necessary growth of equality, and an increasing possibility of successful democracy of the liberal type.

In communities of each type that has now been described there are characteristic social bonds. They are products of all the factors to which we have given consideration, namely: the character of the environment, the size and composition of the population, and its degree of homogeneity, the dominant stimuli to which it responds, and the form of its co-operation.

In the small and isolated population, ethnically and mentally homogeneous, there is a strong consciousness of kind, and the community is held together largely by acts of imitation and of kindness.

In the small and heterogeneous community occupying some especially favored spot within a larger national domain, as for example, a rich metalliferous tract to which men that were strangers to one another have come in pursuit of material well-being, the sympathetic element of the consciousness of kind, and other bonds that hold the kindred folk together, are relatively unimportant. Through conflict between man and man a general condition of toleration is brought about, and a bond of spontaneous justice is gradually supplemented by good will and neighborly helpfulness. In such a community there is also spontaneous allegiance to daring leadership; and a more or less contagious emotion may at times become a powerful social bond.

In the compound population created by invasions and conquests, the power of the conquerors to inspire fear or reverence, and the obedience or loyalty of the conquered, are the chief social bonds. These are permanent, however, only if the character of the country, the economic opportunities, and the opportunities for adventure, are not such as to lead to a dispersion of the conquerors and a disintegration of their own social cohesion, as happened throughout large parts of the Roman Empire, and especially in France, along the Rhine, and in northern Italy after the barbarian invasions. When such dispersion occurs the political chaos and incessant petty conflict that follow result in the creation of bonds of intrigue and conspiracy. When, however, conflict has been carried far enough to eliminate elements excessively unlike and unequal, conspiracy gives place to relations of contract. In the political system a merely political sovereignty is developed into a legal sovereignty. Finally, when through assimilation a complex and highly differentiated population has become so far homogeneous in mental constitution and in culture that common ideals are cherished, especially ideals of liberty and of enlightenment, the chief social bonds may consist in patriotism, fidelity, honesty, and unselfish social service.

Each type of community gives rise to a certain type of social theory, and herein we have a final and especially interesting disclosure of the relation of environment to the intellectual processes when the phenomena collectively are looked upon as groupings of stimuli and response.

The kindred community, living in an isolated environment, can have only natural genesis theories of social origin. The community is pictured—as in the creation myths of our North American Indians—as sprung from a totemistic and matriarchal ancestry; or—as in the social traditions of the Semitic and Aryan stocks—as descended from a patriarchal family. In such communities also, the only conception of the psychological ground of the social relation itself that can be entertained is some form of the idea of natural brotherhood, a primitive germ of the notion that may afterwards be developed into the so-called sympathy theories of society.

In the simple and homogeneous communities that are sometimes brought together by congregation when the economic opportunity attracts men of one kind only, as for example, fisher folk, or woodsmen, or farmers, there can arise only those consciousness of kind theories that are reflected in the proverb, "birds of a feather flock together," and natural justice theories of an elementary sort.

In the heterogeneous society that is formed by a congregation of miscellaneous elements alike in little except a bold and adventurous disposition—such a society as was seen along the Ohio and the Mississippi rivers in the days of the voyagers and flat-boatmen, or, at a later time among the ranchmen of the great plains—where kinship ties count for nothing, and one man is as good as another, the only social philosophy possible is the brutal theory, uncritically accepted, that might makes right; but when, later on, conflict has established an equilibrium of strength, and toleration emerges, the philosophy of might slowly gives place to theories of natural justice.

Where a wide and bountiful environment has been conquered by invaders, and the invaded are being reduced to subjection under the hammering of a compact invading host, the only native theories of social causation are those of race or class conflict, and of political sovereignty. If, subsequently, the invaders disperse, and as a class become disintegrated, as the Normans did in the days of Stephen, and as the Lombard invaders of Italy did, and a struggle of every group for itself, or even of every man for himself within the group, supervenes, until intrigue and conspiracy, such as prevailed in the decaying years of the feudal régime, reduce society literally to that state of nature that was described by Hobbes, no other social theory can be conceived than that one which was set forth by Machiavelli in the pages of "The Prince." When, however, out of such chaos a new social order emerges through an elimination of excessively antagonistic elements, the way is prepared for a broader understanding and agreement. It is then that contract theories and legal sovereignty theories arise to explain the new condition.

And at last, when the inhabitants of a compact state or of a great nation have undergone much assimilation, and their consciousness of kind has become both moral confidence and a comprehension of mind by mind, and when the ruder social bonds of obedience and justice have been transmuted into fidelity, honor and social service, there can arise a great variety of complicated explanations of so complex a social system. They may include evolutionist theories, psychological theories, developed forms of the contract theory, and, above all, idealistic theories expressive of the possibility of remodelling society in accordance with some Utopian plan. It was after the age of Pericles that Plato dreamed "The Republic," and in the Macedonian empire that Aristotle created "The Politics."